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Abstract. We argue that Frey’s proposals are utopian and impractical, focusing on four key 
issues: the complexity of decision-making; politicians’ and technocrats’ importance in 
decision making processes; reconciling the geography of political rights in a globalising 
world; and recognizing how power frames political discourse and outcomes. 
 






While we share Frey’s concerns regarding democracy’s global future and applaud some of 
his provocative proposals, nevertheless many of his suggestions appear utopian and 
impractical.  They are utopian because they are predicated on assumptions that people are 
rational, deeply interested in participating in public decision making, and are able and willing 
to devote considerable time and resources towards formulating informed judgements on 
matters of public concern.  They are impractical because they are not suitable for coherent, 
long-term planning and would likely generate significant (and economically damaging) 
political uncertainty and instability.  
                                                          
1 Sean Fox is a lecturer and Ron Johnston a professor in the School of Geographical Sciences at the University 
of Bristol (sean.fox@bristol.ac.uk; R. Johnston@bristol.ac.uk). 
2 School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1SS, UK 
2 
 
Our discussion of his proposals focus on four key issues: the complexity of democratic 
decision-making; the valuable roles politicians and technocrats play in such decision-making; 
the challenge of reconciling the geography of political rights in a globalising world; and the 
importance of recognizing how power fundamentally frames political discourse and 
outcomes. 
 
1. Countries are not Companies  
Underpinning Frey’s proposals is a tacit assumption that ‘democracy’ is primarily a function 
of the operations of a unitary state with clear objectives, and with decision-making structures 
that can be tweaked to promote greater input from key stakeholders. More succinctly, he 
seems to view the democratic state as a kind of company; indeed, he directly compares 
decision-making processes in both. This is problematic.  
Please no empty space between the paragraphs and 1.5 line space.  
The governing apparatus of a modern democratic society is extremely complex. 
Unlike companies, which have a singular overarching goal (i.e. profit), democratic societies 
are in a constant state of negotiating and implementing goals that entail trade-offs in the 
allocation of public resources. Even when a goal appears to be collectively agreed, there is 
often fierce debate on the means of achieving it.  (Nobody told President Trump that health 
care ‘could be so complicated’!)   
Moreover, modern democracies are better understood as a form of political 
‘catallaxy’, to borrow a term from Hayek (1978). They are an emergent phenomenon 
comprised of many individuals, organisations and agencies engaged in a constant but 
structured competition to set goals and acquire a share of the resources derived from taxation. 
In other words, it would be more apt to compare a democratic order to an economic system, 
rather than conceptualise it as the product of the functions of a singular actor in the system 
(i.e. the ‘state’). 
Electorates play a crucial role in shaping the catallaxy by electing legislatures and 
governments committed to an explicit political programme of policies to achieve defined 
goals – for which actions they will be held to account. But frequent interference with those 
actions, through mechanisms associated with direct democracy (such as referendums) is more 
likely to impede than ensure success.  
 
2. In Praise of Politicians and Technocrats 
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There is a substantial body of empirical research showing that very few electors take the time 
to assemble information and engage in critical debate to formulate informed, rational 
judgements about questions of public policy—and then vote accordingly (see Achen and 
Bartels 2016).  Instead, most people act on partial information and use short-cut heuristics to 
come to judgements, such as whether or not they ‘like’ a party leader, or how they feel about 
the way issues are rhetorically framed (see Weston 2006), or how questions are asked 
(Kahneman, 2011). Moreover, there is abundant evidence that most people do not want to be 
regularly consulted: low turnout rates at elections, referendums and other votes tend to occur 
in places where opportunities to vote are most frequent (Qvortrup, 2005). And there is no 
convincing evidence that offering other means of voting, such as by post or electronically, 
substantially increases turnout or stimulates participation among those who normally abstain. 
As V. O. Key (1966) once observed, for most people politics is just ‘a side-show in 
the circus of life’. Many other things take precedence in the contest for their attention. For 
‘good’ decisions to be made that genuinely reflect real collective preferences and interests (as 
opposed to perceived interests) people need both the motivation and means to engage deeply 
in deliberative processes. Yet, as many commentators of the contemporary scene are making 
clear, there are growing numbers of individuals in many societies who are choosing not to 
participate in electoral politics (Evans and Tilley, 2017) or have decided to use other means 
of expressing their views and pursuing their goals (Gest, 2016). Frey’s utopian goals are 
unachievable unless the alienation, anxiety and anomie underpinning these trends can be 
addressed (Standing, 2016). 
The professionalization of politics and politicians in representative democracies, 
which Frey clearly disapproves of, is a partial (very imperfect) solution to the problem of 
voter apathy and irrational decision-making. It is a form of specialisation in the political 
sphere that makes decision-making more efficient—a corollary in some respects to 
specialisation and exchange in the market place. Politicians are professional story-tellers and 
decision-makers. They develop rhetorical heuristics about key issues for the voting public 
and—crucially—specialise in understanding the complex trade-offs in policymaking that 
derive from the fact of limited resources and the inherent conflicts of interests among 
different segments of society. Politicians are charged with understanding legal intricacies, 
budget processes and particular governance challenges (e.g. related to transport of public 
health) that would take average voters years to get to grips with. And they have legions of 
specialists and bureaucrats to consult in the formulation of new policies or plans. Even so, the 
sheer magnitude of the legislative task limits the extent to which any individual can be well-
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informed on every issue—especially in larger countries. As a result, even within the realm of 
professional politics there is further specialisation (e.g. through committee structures and 
commissions) as well as institutionalised heuristics (e.g. party whips) to facilitate collective 
decision-making.  As noted below, we are naturally concerned by evidence that professional 
politicians tend to come from privileged backgrounds. This is a problem. But this problem 
should not be conflated with the issue of political professionalization per se (on which see 
Lamprinakou et al., 2017). 
In short, professional politicians and bureaucrats are often in a better position to make 
informed judgements on matters of public policy than the general public. This is not a 
popular assertion, but it is almost certainly true. This doesn’t mean that the public should not 
be regularly consulted. But it highlights the appropriate role of elections in democracy: to 
establish a broad direction of collective travel through the election of representatives who 
articulate desirable goals for society, not to micromanage the pursuit of those goals.  
This is all the more important as political units grow in size. Frey approaches the subject 
from an admittedly (and uniquely) Swiss perspective. But the population of Switzerland is 
roughly that of the County of Greater London. What works in Switzerland is almost certainly 
not transferable to substantially larger countries.3 Indeed, Frey doesn’t address the question of 
scale at all. He would be wise to reflect on Robert Dahl’s observation concerning the physical 
limits of direct democracy:  
[Nothing] can overcome the dismal fact that as the number of citizens increases the 
proportion who can participate directly in discussions with their top leaders must 
necessarily grow smaller and smaller. The inherent constraint is neither evil men nor evil 
institutions, nor any other eradicable aspect of human life, but rather a dimension of all 
existence that is morally neutral, because it is implacable, unswerving, and inescapable 
— time (Dahl 1967, 957). 
Just as specialisation and exchange allows economies to grow increasingly complex and 
productive, specialisation in politics, in the form of professional politicians and bureaucrats, 
allows societies to successfully tackle increasingly complex collective challenges through 
informed, deliberative decision-making processes. 
 
3. People, Places and Political Rights 
                                                          
3 See Lea Raible and Leah Trueblood, ‘The Swiss system of referendums and the impossibility of direct 
democracy’: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/04/04/lea-raible-and-leah-trueblood-the-swiss-system-of-
referendums-and-the-impossibility-of-direct-democracy/ (accessed 13 April 2017). 
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Frey raises an interesting point in noting that disenfranchised foreigners are uniquely 
dissatisfied in Switzerland. This speaks to a broader issue about who should have rights to 
vote where—an issue that has grown in significance with the intensification of international 
labour mobility, especially in the EU. 
Should a French worker who lives, works and pays taxes in the UK have voting rights 
in the UK? Should a British expatriate permanently residing in Spain have voting rights in the 
UK? And which local government area should a commuter vote in: the place residence or 
place of work, or both? 
Within a democratic system Frey’s proposed solution to such questions is voting with 
variable weights. This is an unprincipled proposal – as are his parallel arguments for voting 
rights weighted by age. Why should an individual’s political rights appreciate or depreciate in 
mechanical fashion with the passage of time? One is either a member of the demos, directly 
affected by the decisions and actions of a government, or not. We fully agree that citizenship 
status should not decide the allocation voting rights (see Fox, Johnston and Manley 2016), 
but rights cannot be granted in fractions. One would not consider a partial right to due 
process in law, or a partial right to freedom of assembly. This is a slippery slope. The 
franchise should be granted in full in line with a reasonable interpretation of the principle of 
affected interests.  
Underpinning Frey’s proposal—particularly with regard to commuters and local electoral 
rights—is an assumption that political boundaries are fixed. He does not consider the 
alternative to rigging vote shares: redrawing political boundaries.  Here there is almost 
certainly scope for constructive reforms. As towns and cities grow, and as functional 
metropolitan regions emerge consisting of constellations of discrete but interdependent 
settlements, old political boundaries and structures may need revising.  And gerrymandering 
has distorted representation in many democracies, contributing to voter apathy and cynicism 
and, in the case of the United States, an ideological polarisation of legislatures (McGann et 
al., 2016; Daley, 2016). Rather than introduce arbitrary rules about variable weights, perhaps 
our attention should be focused on modernizing the political geography of troubled 
democracies. 
4. On Probability and Power  
Perhaps the most intriguing and superficially appealing of Frey’s proposals is the introduction 
of randomness and probability to shake up decision-making processes with a view towards 
disrupting entrenched power structures. As quantitatively-oriented social scientists we are 
drawn to such an idea. But as historically-minded ones we find it naïve. 
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People who are not motivated to undertake the detailed calculus required to make 
informed electoral decisions are open to the influence of myriad interest groups. This 
influence can be exercised directly, by promising certain outcomes in return for political 
support, or indirectly by shaping public perception (e.g. through the media).  The proponents 
of different views regarding a proposal may well have different resources available with 
which to put their case to the electorate, which subverts the principle of equality that 
underpins the philosophy of democratic practice. There is plenty of evidence that money can 
‘buy’ votes, especially in countries (such as the USA) where constitutional protections 
around freedom of speech allow essentially unlimited campaign spending by interest groups. 
More perniciously, those with resources and influence can deploy less explicit ‘nudge’ 
strategies to influence public opinion and behaviour (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009; Shipman, 
2016).  Inequality of resources across interest groups therefore translates into unequal 
influence. A bit of chance won’t significantly alter this situation. Indeed, key influencers 
could conceivably rig such systems in their favour or insulate themselves through hedging.  
Economic equality is needed to ensure that all citizens have the same opportunity not 
only to evaluate information to arrive at informed judgments, but also to seek to influence 
others as they undertake the same tasks. This is a problem in a world where most 
democracies are not only highly unequal, but becoming more so.  What is more, many 
societies now also contain a substantial, and growing, precariat (Standing, 2016), comprising 
many individuals and households who are denizens but not citizens: without full citizenship 
and the rights that go with it, these people (many but not all of them migrants) are excluded 
from the franchise and so unable to influence political decisions through democratic 
channels.  Conversely, the ‘professional political class’ is increasingly dominated by 
individuals from particular backgrounds and with particular value and attitude sets, termed 
the ‘anywheres’ by Goodhart (2017; on the British case see Criddle, 2015).   
Equality of political rights does not ensure equal political influence, and increasing the 
role of direct participation risks exacerbating inequality of influence by giving those with the 
greatest resources even more opportunity to exercise their voice. But introducing an element 
of randomness, or in some other way altering an electoral system, would not change 
structural imbalances in power (and voice) in a society, and is therefore unlikely to alter 
electoral outcomes substantially in the long run. 
5. Conclusion 
Ultimately, Frey’s title is misleading. His proposals are not about democracy per se but rather 
participation in decision-making processes. Yet democracy isn’t just about how policy 
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decisions are made; it is also about the rule of law, the protection of universal civil and 
political rights, and the institutionalisation of mechanisms for holding our leaders to account.  
Democracies across the West appear increasingly vulnerable to populist movements 
that threaten to erode several of these pillars of true democracy, inspired by a growing fissure 
between those who have benefited from the steady march towards a liberal global order and 
those who feel they have not (Goodhart, 2017). Against this backdrop Frey’s diagnosis is 
flawed and his proposed remedies inadequate. People do not want to spend more time and 
effort pouring over legislative proposals or micromanaging policy development and 
implementation. Indeed, it is not uncommon in Britain today for people to moan about ‘yet 
another election’. Representative democracy—rather than direct democracy—is therefore a 
useful tool. But it requires regular maintenance. Rather than introduce new and clever voting 
technologies, we would encourage a focus first on fixing what is clearly broken. Three issues 
in particular stand out. 
First, the distribution of voting rights has become increasingly distorted through 
international migration. Modernising the franchise would empower many millions of adults 
to re-engage with formal political processes in their country of residence. Second, political 
boundary revision is required in many places to correct for past manipulations and (less 
perniciously) distortions arising from the geodemographic evolution of human settlements. 
Third, concerted efforts need to be made to redress the economic inequalities that translate 
directly into political inequalities (and political grievances). It is impossible to create and 
sustain perfect equality (Everett and Everett 2015), which would be required for Frey’s vision 
of direct democracy to be viable. But more could surely be done to counter recent trends 
towards increasing inequality. Without much greater economic and social equality a true 
democracy can never be created. 
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